Wednesday, November 10, 2010

A simple earnings model for FBP

FBP management will put out a presentation before they embark on their roadshow to raise capital. In those presentations, it is common to present an earnings forecast for a few years forward. In this post, I am going to attempt to present an estimate of what that earnings forecast will look like. This is not a bottom-up earnings forecast based on fundamentals. Rather it is based on what management has said directly or alluded to in regulatory filings. I am trying to guess what they are going to say not defend that as being likely. In fact, I think most would say that this is very optimistic. It probably is and maybe their forecast will be less rosy. But the take-way will be that even if it is much less rosy, they should be able to attract capital at a pretty good price and there should be considerable upside for the stock.

So what is the evidence of what management expects for earnings?

One main piece of evidence is a press release on April, 26 2010 where they say the following:


Mr. Alemán concluded, “The Corporation continues to reduce its credit exposure through disposition of assets and different loss mitigation initiatives as we approach the end of this difficult credit cycle in the Florida region. In Puerto Rico, our main market, there are initial signs of stabilization in the local economy. During the first quarter of 2010 we have experienced an improvement in the absorption rates of our residential construction projects, as well as an increase in auto sales financings and stable residential mortgage originations. Being far enough through the credit cycle, we expect a decrease in the demand for additional loan loss provisioning during the upcoming quarters.”


and


The Corporation and its advisors have been meeting with a number of prospective investors. The Corporation has provided those investors with internal projections that suggest that, by 2014, First BanCorp could have $290 million in pre-tax earnings. This projection assumes, among other things, that the Corporation will have no significant loan portfolio write-downs after 2011. That will require a strengthening of the Puerto Rico economy and a number of other improvements in the Corporation’s operating environment, which may or may not take place. In addition, it will require that FirstBank’s competitive position not be weakened by the expected consolidation of the Puerto Rico banking industry. Finally, this projection does not reflect the benefit from any additional capital, which is expected to improve the Corporation’s financial prospects. As with any forward looking information, there is a substantial possibility that the projected level of earnings will not be achieved.


So we have our first data point. With the usual caveats of (it depends on the economy etc..), they are expecting 2014 Pre-tax earnings of $290MM. We should also note that this press release was in April. They probably made that forecast to investors in March, seven months ago. That was before the economy in Puerto Rico showed many signs of stabilization. It has now been relatively stable (though not yet growing) for 9 months according to Government Development Bank Data. That was also well before the Puerto Rico Housing Stimulus was launched and before the Fortuno administration announced their dramatic tax cuts. If anything, their long term forecast should have improved since then.

We will make the assumption that after 2014, earnings grow by 4% per year which is typical of banks in normal times. Will the period after 2014 be abnormal? Who knows. But we are just trying to come up with a simple reasonable model based on what management has said.

We have another data-point based on some more subtle technical points made in their most recent 10-Q on page 80. This has to do with the amount of their Deferred Tax Asset (DTA) that is allowed to be included in Tier 1 capital. As it turns out, this depends on their expectations for earnings over the next 12 months.


Approximately $64 million of the Corporation’s deferred tax assets at September 30, 2010 December 31, 2009 — $102 million) were included without limitation in regulatory capital pursuant to the risk-based capital guidelines, while approximately $44 million of such assets at September 30, 2010 (December 31, 2009 — $12 million) exceeded the limitation imposed by these guidelines and, as “disallowed deferred tax assets,” were deducted in arriving at Tier 1 capital. According to regulatory capital guidelines, the deferred tax assets that are dependent upon future taxable income are limited for inclusion in Tier 1 capital to the lesser of: (i) the amount of such deferred tax asset that the entity expects to realize within one year of the calendar quarter end-date, based on its projected future taxable income for that year, or (ii) 10% of the amount of the entity’s Tier 1 capital. Approximately $7 million of the Corporation’s other net deferred tax liability at September 30, 2010 (December 31, 2009 — $5 million) represented primarily the deferred tax effects of unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale debt securities, which are permitted to be excluded prior to deriving the amount of net deferred tax assets subject to limitation under the guidelines.


This allows us to estimate what they think pre-tax earnings will be over the next 12-months. That depends on the tax rate. That is currently 39% but will be lowered to 30% by (I think) April. Let's split the difference and call it 35%. They say they expect to realize $64MM in taxes over the next 12-months. The expected pre-tax earnings is therefore the realized tax divided by the tax rate which is $64MM/0.35 or $183MM.

So, our second data-point is that they expect to realize $183MM in pre-tax earnings over the next 12 months. Lets call that 2011 earnings even though it technically runs over the 4 quarters from Q4 2010 to Q3 2011. They expect pre-tax earnings of $290MM by 2014 so lets use that for 2014. So we just need earnings the two years in between. We will just linearly interpolate for lack of any other info. That gives $218MM in 2012 and $254MM in 2013. Finally, we can write down a table of our expectation for management's expected earnings.

I have also assumed that as they make taxable income, they reverse their DTA valuation allowance of $290MM. So they pay no taxes the first 4 years until it is used up. Alternatively, they could reverse it all sooner but the effect on final tangible common equity is the same. This allows us to calculate net income and tangible common equity in each year. I have further assumed a $500MM capital raise at $0.50 and calculated final TBV. I then valued the stock price at some multiple of TBV. I have assumed 70% the first year and rising to 120% by 2014 and thereafter. So finally, this gives you a stock price target and also the appreciation factor for new investment. For example, in this model, they invest at $0.50 and have more than quadrupled their investment by 2015.



I will end with the disclaimer that no one knows the future; not even management. This isn't even management's prediction. Rather it is my estimate of what it will look like based on what they have already said. When they issue their presentation in a few weeks, we will get more concrete information (hopefully!). For the actual results, we will have to wait for the future to arrive. Good luck!

PR GDB Investor Presentation

I am continually amazed at the ability of Luis Fortuno's administration in Puerto Rico. It seems all we hear about these days in the news are problems and the same old non-solutions to fiscal problems at the US federal level and the state level not to mention the problems in Europe: Greece, Ireland, Portugal Spain etc. That's why the situation in Puerto Rico is so amazing. Puerto Rico looked liked Greece three years ago. They went through a 5 year recession. But now due to incredible leadership from Fortuno, they are emerging from recession, closing in on a balanced budget and are now in a position to cut taxes. The future looks bright for Puerto Rico. This recent presentation from the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank says it all. Enjoy.

Changing the Course of Puertorico Future

Sunday, November 7, 2010

Firstbank's Commercial Bankruptcy Data: 2008-Present

The El Boletin service keeps a database of all public filings of bankruptcies, foreclosures and debt collection lawsuits in Puerto Rico. It is a good resource for studying the banks in Puerto Rico.

In this post, I wish to demonstrate that Firstbank had very few commercial bankruptcy during this banking cycle. In particular, I wish to show that Firstbank was a much, much better lender than Westernbank and also probably better than Banco Popular.

First, we can just query the total bad debt for these three banks between Jan 1, 2008 and the present.

The result is $912MM for Westernbank, $672MM for Banco Popular and only $247MM for Firstbank. Firstbank appear much better than the other two. But you should also adjust for the size of their loans portfolios in Puerto Rico. Firstbank is between the other two in size. The bad debt as percent of total loans in Puerto Rico is 10.6% for Westernbank , 4.5% for Popular and only 1.9% for Firstbank. Again, Firstbank appear much better than the other two when it comes to defaulted debt leaving a public record.

I also queried all commercial bankruptcy filings after Jan 1, 2008 with Firstbank as a creditor that had at least $1 million of total debt and at least $500K for Firstbank. I found only 32 filings. The full list is below.

There is $78MM in total bankruptcy debt, 81% of which is secured debt. Only 7 are Chapter 7 liquidation cases. I looked at the assets/collateral and the type of bankruptcy filings and made a conservative estimate of losses and I came up with about $38MM or almost half the total balance due. Most of the secured debt in Chapter 11 reorganizations should survive without any principal reduction though the bank will surely charge-off the loan to collateral value.

There is only one loan (the $32MM secured loan to failed bank holding company R&G Financial) larger than $6MM. For Westernbank, I have counted 27 such loans over $6MM. Westernbank had 17 such loans over $20MM, their largest being the disastrous Inyx loan for $147MM unless you include the loan to Health Care Group, HIMA, for $400MM that was weak but current though involved in litigation against Westernbank.

In terms of commercial loan blowouts, there is really no comparison between Westernbank and Firstbank. Firstbank was a much, much better lender.

However, it appears that Firstbank has been taking lots of charge-offs and provisions for loan losses despite the low level of actual bankruptcy. For example, if we just look at the C&I and Commercial Mortgage categories we see that they charged off $104MM and $74MM in those two categories respectively in 2009 to the present (2010 Q3). They also have $179MM and $98MM currently in the loan-loss allowance for those two categories. Altogether, they have accounted for $455MM in charge-offs and provisions for those two categories. That is an order of magnitude higher than the actual losses that have shown up in actual bankruptcies. This is an indication that they are very conservatively reserved.

What about foreclosures? You can also count the foreclosure filings with El Boletin. Here is a chart for the major banks in PR. FBP looks to be doing well compared with its peers. Note again that these banks and their loan categories are different sizes. But FBP has a pretty large mortgage portfolio not a small one.




The full list of FBP bankruptcies follows:

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All Commercial Bankruptcies over $1MM (total)
from 1/1/2007 to 11/07/2010
with FBP as creditor for more than $500K
all dollar amounts in $MM
Debtor Chapter FBP Secured FBP Unsecured Total Secured Total Unsecured Assets Notes on loan and assets Conservative estimate of loss
MIRAMAR ARCHITECTURAL PRODUCTS MFG, INC. 7 1.2 0 2.3 0.4 3.5 Inventory/AR based loan 0.5
A & A WASTE MANAGEMNET INC 11 0.5 0 0.6 1.2 4 Land,trucks, machinery, AR 0.1
PUNTO APARTE CIMA PUBLICIDAD, INC. 11 0 2.8 0 5.3 ? Publishing company, assets not listed 2.8
TURBO GASOLINE, INC 11 1.1 0 1.1 0.1 1.6 Gas station lot worth 1.5 0.2
MARRERO MELECIO WALESKA 13 1.5 0 1.6 0.07 1.4 5 houses with mortgages 0.2
CARDONA FUSTER AMALIA E 11 0.5 0 1.7 0.4 ? 0.2
EL MUELLE SHOPPING CENTER 7 4.4 0 6.6 0.2 6.1 Land and buildings worth 5.4 1.5
EL EMBARCADERO, INC. 11 5.8 0 8.3 0.1 13.5 Parcel of Land worth 13.5 0.2
LAUREANO VEGA NOEL 7 1.5 0 1.8 0.8 ? 0.2
OCEAN BAY PROPERTIES, INC. 7 2.2 0 0.2 6.7 1.2 1.5
BROWN TORRES ERIC N. 11 0 1.6 1.7 2.5 ? 1.6
ASOCIADOS DE SAN JUAN 11 1 0 1 0.3 ? 0.4
RUED, INC 11 0 0.8 0 7 ? 0.8
SEGUROS JOAQUIN PALERM, INC. 11 0 1.4 0 1.7 ? 1.4
LOPEZ SANCHEZ MARISOL 7 1.2 0 1.3 0.1 ? 0.5
GONZALEZ PIMIENTEL LEIDEN E. 7 0 1.1 0 1.8 ? 1.1
VILLA PALMERA FUNERAL, INC. 11 0.9 0 0.9 0.4 ? 0.1
LR HOMES CORP. 11 1.5 0.1 1.8 4.5 6.2 0.1
ALEJANDRO ZUNIGA GLORIMAR 7 0.6 0 0.9 0.3 ? 0.2
& INVESTMENT GROUP, CO. 7 0 1.3 0.8 1.7 2.6 1.3
R&G Financial 11 31.8 0 31.8 326.3 68.3 16 loan participations, 40 "total assets"
FBP charged off $15MM which was adaqutely reserved for prior to 2010
15
LA HACIENDA COUNTRY CLUB 11 0.5 0 3.8 1.5 4.7 Colleteralized by building in Santurce 0.1
CASILLAS BURGOS RAUL 13 0.5 0 1 0.1 ? 0.2
ARCE RODRIGUEZ JOSE A 11 0.8 0 3.8 0.06 ? 0.3
LG GUIJARRO TRUST 11 1 0 1.1 0 1.3 COMERCIAL BUILDING-SANTURCE 1.3 0.3
LASTRA POWER EDUARDO J. 7 0 2 0.1 3.2 ? 2
HOSPITAL DE ANIMALES PERLA DEL SUR 11 0 0.9 0 1.4 ? 0.9
ALVAREZ PEREZ ANGEL A. 11 1.5 0 14.5 10.3 20.6 Former FBP CEO 0.3
RODRIGUEZ JARABO EMILIO J. 7 0 1.7 1.3 3.1 ? 1.7
GAETAN SANTIAGO VICTOR 13 1.3 0.02 2.4 0.3 ? 0.5
GONZALEZ PANTALEON PEDRO B 7 0.2 1.2 0.4 1.6 ? 1.4
DIAZ MONCLOVA NILDA M. 11 1.7 0 1.7 0 4.3 House and Commercial Building 4.2 0.1
Total   63.2 14.92 94.5 383.43     37.7
Total defaulted debt 2008-present 78.12
Percent secured 80.9
Expected loss 37.7
Expected loss as percent of total amount owed 48.3
2009-2010 cumulative charge-offs in C&I 104.2
Current Q3 allowance in C&I 179.4
2009-2010 cumulative charge-offs in commercial mort. 73.8
Current Q3 allowance in commercial mortgage 97.8
2009-2010 charge-offs in C&I and Commercial mort 178
Current Q3 allowance in C&I and Comm mortgage 277.2
Chrage offs + allowance in C&I + Comm. Mortgage 455.2